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 Abstract 
This study investigates the political economy of fiscal policy making in West Africa by relying 
on a two-fold estimation technique, namely – the  Instrumental variable regression model which 
accounts for potential endogeneity issue in the data and the Generalized Least Square regression 
model. The analysis covered 14 West African countries and spans over the period 1980 to 2016. 
The  key  results  are  as  follows.  First,  we  find  evidence  that  fiscal  policy  has  been  more 
persistence  in  the  region.  This  suggests that  the  governments  of  West  African  economies  are 
either  unwilling  or  just  unable  to  adequately  implement counter-cyclical  fiscal  policy.  Second, 
fiscal policymaking has  generally been driven by  political and institutional factor rather than on 
the  basis  of  sound  economic  considerations.  And  third,  the  core  politico-institutional  factors 
determining fiscal persistence include corruption, government effectiveness and rule of law. 
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1. Introduction 
Prior to the 1970s, the choice of fiscal policy stance was assumed to be largely a 
macroeconomic phenomenon. Butowing to the resurgence of political economy and the 
emergence of the institutionalist school, economists are now paying closer attention to the non-
economic determinants of fiscal policy persistence and deficit crisis (Lavigne, 2006; Ifere and 
Okoi, 2017)1. Fiscal Policy persistence refers to the dependence of contemporaneous fiscal 
policy on their past behaviour (Afonso, 2010). Persistence in fiscal policy could exist when the 
underlyingtraditional macroeconomic determinants of fiscal policy are overwhelmed by non-
economic variables such as political, institutional, or geographic factors. The situation appears to 
be rife in developing countries, particularly in West Africa,where the fiscal authoritiesarealmost 
alwaysovertly exposed to political intrusionsand therefore more prone to fiscal indiscipline 
(Onye 2017). 
The traditional motivation for implementing discretionary fiscal policy or for running 
afiscal deficit hasprimarily been anchored on its macroeconomic stabilization function, i.e., the 
use of government expenditure and tax policies to smoothen business cycle volatility. This 
entails the use of countercyclical fiscal policy by the governments to smoothen business cycles. 
Notwithstanding the perceived benefit associated with countercyclical policies, a large number of 
studies has shown that fiscal deficit has generally been persistence and indeed pro-cyclical, 
particularly, for West Africa (see Afonso et al 2010; Fatas and Milhov, 2001a and 2001b; van 
den Noord, 2000; Gali, 1994).  For instance, Afonso et al 2010, using data from 132 developed 
and developing countries document that fiscal policyhas generally been counter-cyclical in 
developed countries but pro-cyclical or acyclical in most developing countries. The same authors 
find that the major factors accounting for thiscross-country variationin fiscal policy pro-
cyclicality in developing countries are political and institutional variables rather than 
macroeconomic fundamentals. 
So far, existing line of research on fiscal policy stabilization role and effectiveness have 
tended to focus on two major characteristics of fiscal policy, namely; fiscal policy 
responsiveness and discretion2and has therefore apparently ignored a third fiscal policy 
characteristic, namely, fiscal persistence. The first two sets of fiscal policy characterizations are 
usually employed in studies that investigate fiscal policy effectiveness (using business cycle 
models) and their degree of pro-cyclicality or counter-cyclicality (based on policy rules). In 
particular, most studies on fiscal policy responsiveness focus on the elasticity of government 
spending (or elasticity of tax revenue or fiscal deficit) with respect to output (or its measures). 
Generally and as has been noted, these types of studies find that fiscal policy is more persistent 
in developing economies than advanced economies. In other words, the advanced countries are 
more able to implement counter-cyclical fiscal policy than the less developed ones (see e.g., 
                                                          
1
Fiscal persistence is simply defined as a measure of the dependence of current fiscal behavior – spending and revenue – on its 
past development.  
2 Discretionary fiscal policy is that component of fiscal policy that is due to exogenous government action or extraordinary non-economic 
phenomenon, and not a systematic response to output or macroeconomic conditions 
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Galiet al 2003; Afonso, Alnello and Furceri, 2010;  Afonso, 2008; Afonso and Gonzalez-Alegre, 
2008; Hallerberg and Strauch al 2002).  
Similarly, studies on the effectiveness of fiscal policy focus mainly on the significance 
and sign (also magnitude) of the discretionary (or responsiveness, government size and/or 
spending) parameter in the regression of a business cycle models. The general result that has 
emerged from such studies is that fiscal policy tends to exert stabilizing effect (reflected in 
negative spending parameters) in most of the advanced economies (see e.g., Lee and Tsung 
2007; Fatas and Milhov, 2001a and 2001b; van den Noord, 2000; Gali, 1994).  
Although the third fiscal policy characteristic – fiscal persistence – has generally been 
sidelined, it hasalso apparently become a prominent stylized feature of fiscal policy practice in 
Africa that is not only pervasive but also accountfor thebulk of the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy 
in the region (see e.g., Tarawalie et al. 2014; Onye and Okon, 2017). Therefore, endeavouring to 
understand the nature of fiscal persistence inWest Africa and its political and institutional 
determinants could offer important insights into nature of fiscal policy pro-cyclically across 
countries in the region. This will supply policy lessons for countries in the region particularly on 
how to implement more active and effective counter-cyclical stabilization policy.  
Remarkably, if fiscal policy is found to be more persistent, the fiscal authorities would 
tend to be: (i) less responsive, i.e., - for instance –unwilling and/or unable to spend more during 
recession (or unwilling/unable tospend less during boom) in a counter-cyclical manner; and (ii) 
unable to exercise adequate fiscal policy discretion and could, instead, bepro-cyclical. 
Importantly, such a weak fiscal responsiveness and/or the inability of fiscal authorities to 
exercise adequate discretion could particularly be very damaging during cyclical downturns. It 
could prolong recession or boom beyond the cycle – with damaging consequences for economic 
growth and development. Hence, there is need to properly understand the political economy 
dynamism of fiscal persistence in West Africa. 
The broad objective of this paper is to investigatethe political, institutional and 
macroeconomic determinants of fiscalpersistence in the West African sub-region. The specific 
objectives are two folds, namely: (i) to estimate the magnitude and significance of fiscal 
persistence andunpack the national fiscal positions (spending and revenue) of African economies 
into the three constituent parts –persistence, responsiveness and discretion; and (ii) to investigate 
the impact of political, institutional and macroeconomic variables on fiscalpersistence in West 
Africa. 
A study of this nature is important in many folds. First, as the study unpacks national 
fiscal policy stance of countries in the region, it will help to explain cross-country variation in 
fiscal policy behaviour in West Africa. This is particularly important given the dearth of 
empirical research in this area. Second, the study will elucidate our understanding of the empirics 
of political business cycle (PBC) literature that is conspicuously dearth in economics and yet 
essential for our understanding of the dynamics of electoral spending and its potential impact 
onbusiness cycle. Third, a study of this nature would offer important insight on the pro-cyclically 
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of fiscal policy in West Africa and would, therefore, supply lessons for policy on more active 
and effective counter-cyclical stabilization policy for countries in the region3. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2presents an overview of the 
deficit, debt and growth profile of West African countries. In section 3, we provide a brief survey 
of related literature, focusing particularly on the Political Business cycle (PBC) literature.Section 
4lays out the methodology. In section 5, we present the result and conclude the paper with some 
lessons for policy. 
 
2. Overview of Deficit and Growth Profile of West African countries. 
As theory without facts could put one in a blind alley, we endeavour in this section to 
examine the profile of fiscal deficit and economic growth in the 14 West African countries under 
study. The motivation for this sub-section is to undertake a perceptive overview of the regional 
and countries-specific scorecard on growth and deficit with a view to unearthing any conditional 
relationship that might exist between them. In other words, we try to address the question; does 
the macroeconomic landscape of West African economies say something about the fiscal policy 
stance in the region? 
Economic growth in the West African region was strongest between 2003-2008 and 2011-2015. 
Considering the average growth rate over the period, 1995-2015 (Table 1 and 2), the growth rate varied 
widely. Nigeria’s average growth is the highest for the region as the country posted an average growth 
rate of 6.3% between 1995 and 2015. On the other hand, Guinea Bissau posted the least average growth 
rate of 2% over the same period. Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali and Niger recorded average growth rates of 
6%, 5.8%, 4.9% and 4.5 % respectively. Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and Mali were the next in line as 
regards regional mean growth rates since they, respectively, posted mean growth rates of 4.2 (Senegal), 
4.2 (Sierra Leone), 3.7 (Togo) and 3.2 (Mali).  
Table 1: Fiscal Deficit and Growth Profile of WAEMU economies (1995-2015) 
 
year 1995-00 2001-05 2006-10 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 1995-15 
GHA/Fiscal Deficit 
(LCU'bil.) 
0.21 0.37 2.45 4.46 8.50 11.21 12.40 7.36 
5.87 
Real GDP Growth 4.3 5.0 6.5 14.0 9.3 7.3 4.0 3.9 5.8 
Debt(%GNI)  101.85 104.40 23.05 29.28 32.25 35.79 49.77 56.29 54.1 
NIGERIA /Fiscal 
Deficit 
-280.00 -328.30 70.50 -155.90 -66.40 2002.70 1993.00 3356.70 
824.04 
Real GDP Growth 2.7 11.1 7.2 4.9 4.3 5.4 6.3 2.7 6.3 
Output Gap -1.30 -4.50 1.90 1.10 -0.20 -0.20 1.00 -1.10 -.041 
Debt(%GNI)  98.90 55.40 7.20 4.50 4.10 4.30 4.50 6.20 23.14 
GAMBIA /Fiscal 
Deficit 
0.01 0.60 0.60 1.25 1.28 2.76 2.04 3.35 
1.49 
Real GDP Growth 3.9 3.1 4.7 -4.3 5.9 4.8 0.9 4.7 3.5 
Debt(%GNI)  57.60 111.40 73.90 57.70 61.30 62.80 63.80 .. 69.79 
SIERRA L./Fiscal 
Deficit 
-29.80 18.20 253.80 413.40 377.30 405.10 380.90 387.00 
275.74 
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 The ECOWAS countries in the West African Sub-region that are included in our sample include 8 WAEMU 
economies (Benin, Bukina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Togo, Guinea Bissau,Mali and Niger) and 6 WAMZ economies 
(Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Gambia, Siera Leone and Liberia).  
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Real GDP Growth -0.9 7.9 5.8 4.8 15.2 20.7 4.6 -20.6 4.2 
Debt(%GNI)  174.00 117.40 39.50 34.40 32.60 28.60 25.70 31.40 60.45 
GUINEA/ Fiscal 
Deficit 
114.90 316.40 1078.00 422.70 1295.50 2241.50 1977.70 4537.60 
1498.04 
Real GDP Growth 4.0 3.1 2.2 3.9 3.9 2.3 0.4 0.1 2.9 
Debt(%GDP)  95.90 108.20 94.90 72.00 26.40 24.30 23.10 22.30 58.39 
LIBERIA/ Fiscal Deficit      -  - -  -  58.39 
Real GDP Growth 32.5 -3.1 7.2 8.2 8.0 8.7 0.7 0.0 11.5 
Debt(%GDP)         -  - -  -  - 
Key: External debt stock is current US$; real GDP is measured at 2010 constant US$; 
 
With respect to the fiscal outcomes, Guinea posted the largest fiscal deficit with the region with 
a deficit of 1498.04. This is followed by Nigeria (824.04), Togo (483.44), Cote d’Ivoire (310.84), and 
Burkina Faso (117.42).  
Looking at the country-specific scorecard on economic growth, the real GDP growth rate was 
uneven among the countries in 2016. The Gambia recorded a growth rate of 4.7 percent in 2015, 
compared with 0.9 percent in 2014 and 4.8 in 2013. The growth rate in Ghana decelerated marginally to 
7.36 percent in 2015, from 12.4 percent recorded in 2014. In Guinea, real GDP growth was lethargic 
between 2012 and 2015, plummeting from 3.9% in 2012 to 2.3 % in 2013 and 0.4% (2014) and 
0.1(2015). In Liberia, real GDP grew by 0% in 2015. The situation in Nigeria closely mimics the that of 
Liberia over the same period. Real GDP in Nigeria plummeted from 6.3% in 2014 to 2.6% in 2015 and by 
2016 Nigeria consistently posted negative growth rate in the first, second and third quarters of the year- 
a situation of economic recession. As Onye and Umoh (2017) documents, Nigeria’s recent economic 
recession is one that was orchestrated by plummeting price of crude oil which is the major source of 
foreign exchange earning for the country. This resulted in a drastic drain of the country foreign exchange 
reserve.  
Table 2: Fiscal Deficit and Growth Profile of WAEMU economies (1995-2015) (contd.) 
          
BEN/year 1995-00 2001-05 2006-10 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 1995-15 
Fiscal Deficit (LCU'bil.) 0.21 0.37 2.45 4.46 8.50 11.21 12.40 373.864 89.43 
Real GDP Growth 4.3 5.0 6.5 14.0 9.3 7.3 4.0 2.1 4.5 
Debt(%GDP)  59.55 43.02 16.59 24.08 25.58 22.27 21.49 25.79 - 
BURKINA FASO/Fiscal 
Deficit 
47.22 104.55 33.10 69.53 177.21 235.59 119.61 152.54 
117.42 
Real GDP Growth 6.6 6.4 5.5 6.6 6.5 5.7 4.0 4.0 6 
Debt(%GDP)  52.98 44.31 21.27 22.04 23.50 21.50 20.87 24.01 28.8 
GUINEA BISSAU/Fiscal 
Deficit 
5.16 11.37 2.05 4.18 11.37 9.17 7.79 10.93 
7.75 
Real GDP Growth 0.1 1.8 3.3 9.3 -1.8 0.8 2.5 4.8 2 
Debt(%GDP)  388.41 220.18 148.03 25.68 28.09 27.04 24.56 29.90 11.49 
SENEGAL/ Fiscal Deficit 34.74 1.69 34.92 114.36 128.10 110.97 154.68 218.22 99.71 
Real GDP Growth 4.3 4.7 3.5 1.8 4.4 3.5 4.3 6.5 4.2 
Debt(%GDP)  80.44 63.12 25.07 30.30 35.38 35.78 36.35 43.48 43.74 
MALI/ Fiscal Deficit 55.58 69.27 -98.46 209.25 60.75 155.14 204.74 141.15 99.68 
Real GDP Growth 4.3 7.1 4.6 3.2 -0.8 2.3 7.0 6.0 4.9 
Debt(%GDP)  108.17 69.37 23.05 23.35 25.59 26.72 24.49 28.87 41.2 
NIGER/ Fiscal Deficit 39.12 44.34 -116.23 44.74 39.63 96.96 327.43 386.38 107.8 
Real GDP Growth 2.9 4.0 5.2 2.3 11.8 5.3 7.0 3.6 4.5 
Debt(%GDP)  86.49 74.68 23.02 35.14 34.55 35.55 32.97 40.85 45.41 
TOGO/ Fiscal Deficit 60.06 113.68 -48.40 581.18 851.79 509.50 818.06 981.64 483.44 
Real GDP Growth 5.1 1.1 
 
4.9 4.8 4.0 5.9 5.4 3.7 
Debt(%GDP)  103.31 100.42 65.75 19.46 22.75 26.06 24.48 29.12 48.92 
CIV/ Fiscal Deficit 90.92 80.95 122.97 483.74 430.39 346.07 378.52 553.14 310.84 
Real GDP Growth 3.8 0.0 2.2 -4.4 10.7 8.9 8.5 9.2 3.2 
Debt(%GDP)  144.14 95.50 64.29 52.39 36.30 32.55 29.18 34.08 61.05 
Key: External debt stock is current US$; real GDP is measured at 2010 constant US$; 
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 Figure 1 shows the scatter chart of fiscal deficit versus economic growth in West African 
economies. We superimpose a fitted nonparametric-regression line on the scatter chart in order to shed 
light on any potential unconditional relationship that might exist between the variables. 
 
Figure 1: Scatter Chart of Fiscal Deficit versus Growth (1995-2015 Average) 
 
 
As is obvious from Figure 1, the relationship between deficit and growth across West African economies 
appears negative and weak.  In particular, Figure 1 buttresses a situation where countries with relatively 
lower fiscal deficit made impressive growth performance. This appears to be the situation for Gambia, 
Ghana, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Benin, Liberia, Mali, and Togo. Of course, Nigeria and 
Guinea are exceptions to this. Nonetheless, Nigeria’s case is not too surprising given the fact that 
petroleum export constitutes Nigeria major source of revenue. Thus, the general picture that emerges 
from Figure 1 seems to suggest that economic factors alone do not tell the whole story about fiscal 
deficit and deficit persistence. 
 
 
3. Literature:  Fiscal Policy Persistence and Political Business Cycle  
Several theories have been put forward to explain the interaction of political and 
institutional factors with economic outcomes. Many of these theories revolve around the so-
called political business cycle model (PBC) which is the model that tries to analyze how 
macroeconomic fundamentals behave when political factors are at play (Taramelie et al 2014). 
These are theories that aredeveloped to explain the effect of the election cycle and other political 
and institutional characteristics on macroeconomic policy making and outcomes. The PBC often 
signify the economy’s fluctuation around its long-run trend due to political pressures and 
influence of powerful interest groups. Prominent among the political business cycle models are: 
(i) Equilibrium model by Barro (1979) and Lucas and Stockey (1983); 
(iii) Politico-institutional model of Person (2001) and Person and Tabellini (1999, 2001), 
Alesinaand Tabellini (2008); 
(iv) Elite mass model and group model that is associated the California State University Long 
Beach, n.d; 
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 (v) Opportunistic PBC model associated with  Norhaus (1975), Perroti and Kontopoulos (2002), 
Volkerink and De Haan (2001), Franzese (2002), Mink and De Haan (2005), Andrikopoulos et al 
(2004), Alesina and Roubeini (1997)  
(vi) Partisan political business cycle (PBC) model or ideological cycle by Hibbs (1977), Rogoff 
and Siebert (1988) and elaborated by  Rogoff (1990), and Nordhaus (1975), Mackic (2014)  
among others;  
(vii) Uncertainty Model by Pasten and Cover (2010) 
 
 The equilibrium model of Barro (1979) and Lucas and Stockey (1983) postulates that that 
shocks in spending and revenue should be smoothed by budget deficits and surpluses and by 
keeping tax rate relatively constant. Nonetheless, the tax smoothening hypothesis does not 
explain persistence in fiscal deficit for most developing and some advanced countries, hence 
broader and more robust theoretical framework and been proposed. In this regard, Alesina and 
Perotti (1995, 1996b) argue that economic factors alone do not suffice in explaining the fiscal 
persistence and that the issue could be resolved by taking a political and institutional perspective.  
 The political and institutional perspective to the determinants of the deficit and deficit 
persistence is due to the seminal works of Person (2001) and Person and Tabellin (2001) which 
have been refined in the ensuing literature by Hallerber and Strauch (2002). Sorensen et al 
(2001) and Lane (2003) among.Others.For instance, Hallerber and Strauch (2002). Sorensen et al 
(2001) argue that fiscal policy is less counter-cyclical, ie., less anti-cyclical, during election years 
suggesting a situation of pro-cyclicality. Alesina and Tabellini (2008) found that most of the pro-
cyclicality of fiscal policy in developing countries can be explained by the high level of 
corruption. More recently, Afonso et al (2010) have shown that while government size 
(spending-GDP ratio) leads to increase in fiscal persistence, they tend to impact discretionary 
component of fiscal policy negatively. Similarly, Person and Tabellini (1999) argue that fiscal 
outcome might be different across regime (presidential and parliamentary). Under the 
presidential system, government size and redistribution could be smaller because as a system 
tends to be more transparent and centralized, fiscal policy can be formulated and implemented 
without much delay, interference and cost. The opposite may be true of a parliamentary system 
depending on the electoral laws. In this regard, Alesina and Perotti (1995) and Person and 
Tabellin (1997) find that large deficit, rising debt and fiscal presence is more common in 
countries with a parliamentary system. Qno (2003) emphasized the central role of political 
factors such as political stability, legislativeturnover and institutional factors such as budgetary 
procedure and rules, bureaucracy, efficiency and democracy on fiscal deficit and persistence. 
 The Elite Mass and Group models postulate, in general,  that as long as the probability of 
remaining in office between election years is less than one, the deficit will tend to be trend-
driven rather than cyclical (counter or pro-) which will thereby increase the probability fiscal 
persistence and sovereign debt crisis. Closely related to this is the theory of fiscal illusion – the 
assumption that factors which obscure or weaken governments’ spending-tax nexus would 
distort the voter's appreciation of the true cost/benefit of government fiscal actions thereby 
resulting in inefficient allocation of resources. The elite-mass theory divides the human society 
into two: the powerful elite group (e.g., politicians and public administrators) and the less 
powerful masses (e.g., labourers or workers).The central proposition of the elite-mass theory is 
that since the masses are ill-informed, apathetic and only able to influence the political process 
indirectly through voting, public policies are only but the reflection of the preferences of the 
powerful elite.And so, fiscal policymaking could be driven largely by political interest and 
factors rather than economic fundamentals. Similarly, the group model posits that public policies 
if primarily the reflection of the preferences and interests of powerful pressure group in the 
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system. According to this theory, policymakersincorporate the interest of pressure groups by 
negotiating and compromising among competing demand and that the influence of these pressure 
groups could be so powerful that public policy ends up reflecting their interest as opposed to the 
interest of thegeneral public (masses).  
Depending on the underlying assumption about key characteristics of political parties (e.g 
whether the ideological leaning is partisan or opportunistic) or voter characteristics, a number of 
political business cycle models have been developed. For instance,Nordhaus (1975) pioneering 
work on the ‘formal theoretical opportunistic framework’ assume an adaptive expectation 
scheme by a voter in which voting is based on economic performance in the recent past. Under 
this adaptive scheme, an opportunistic incumbent will find it optimal to generate a cycle of 
economic stimulus before elections as it corresponds to his term in office, not minding recession 
in the post-election period. Under this scenario, fiscal policy would tend to be pro-cyclical when 
the period of boom coincides with pre-election spending or when recession coincides with post-
election years. The Nordhaus (1975) model is explained with Philip’s curve inflation-
unemployment short-run in which politicians embark on spending glut as election approaches, 
not minding inflationary implications (Tarawalie, 2014) which are followed by macroeconomic 
austerity measure at the close of the political cycle upon the assumption of office. Regrettably, 
this sort of fiscal policy strategy is bound fiscal policy persistence and sub-optimal outcome with 
any real gain in output growth. 
The closest rivalry model to the opportunistic PBC model is the ideological cycle or partisan 
model which was due to the pioneering works of Hibbs (1977). The central postulation of the 
ideological cycle is that political parties are partisan or ideological and therefore choose 
economic policies based on party ideology.  Depending on the party in power, economic policies 
change and partisan preferences shape [policy making and drives business cycle. According to 
the theory, the key actor or agent of policymaking may not be a powerful elite group as with the 
Nordhaus (1975) opportunistic BCM, but instead, the pressure group or electorate with the party 
that identify preferences according to the party platform 
 
 The Rogoff and Siebert (1988) PBC model were developed in 1988 based on the 
underlying assumption that voters are myopic and do not know the competencies of the politician 
ab-initio, and therefore can only base their rational expectations using the observable outcomes 
of a current policy during elections. According to this model, all politicians irrespective of the 
level of competency will attach equal weight to reelection but only competent incumbents 
politician will usually show their competency by promoting an expansionary fiscal policy which 
will result in a pre-election fiscal deficit. On the other hand, a politician with low competency 
will usually not undertake such actions. In this regard, voters will adjudge incumbents 
performance based on their pre-election spending on public goods and pre-election non-
distortive taxes but would only learn of the loss of their income (via distortive tax and less public 
goods)after elections are held. 
 
A number of studies have empirically examined the institutional, political and 
macroeconomic determinants of fiscal deficit and/or deficit persistence. For instance, Javid, Arif, 
and Arif(2011) examine the economic, political and institutional determinants of fiscal deficit 
and deficit persistence for the south Asian and AESEAN countries over the period of 1984 to 
2010. Their study employed the dynamic panel data models to take ac 
persistence in the volatility behaviour and identify the factors determining  
of budget deficit and its volatility. The same author employed rule of law, political stability, 
government effectiveness and regulatory quality as the politico-institutional variables 
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determining fiscal deficit and deficit volatility. Similarly, Ifere and Okoi, (2017) examine the 
political economy of fiscal deficit in Nigeria using descriptive statistic and Ordinary Least 
Square regression technique. The authors made use of variables such CIPA fiscal policy rating, 
index of political right and turnover in the national assembly. Their finding from their study 
suggests that fiscal policymaking in Nigeria is driven more by political factors rather thanon the 
basis of sound economic considerations consideration.In a related study, Fatas and Milhov 
(2006) investigate how a strict budget restriction, such as a deficit benchmark impact fiscal 
policy.The same authors found that budget restriction or the use of fiscal rules leads to leads to 
lessvolatility in deficit but that the same benchmark could potentially reduce the responsiveness 
of fiscal policy to output shock. As we see in Onye et al (2017), while lessdiscretion which is 
associated with budget benchmarks is known to reduce volatility, less responsiveness of fiscal 
policy might amplify business cycle. Thus, fiscal benchmarks such as the ones imposed by the 
Convergence Criteria in the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) or Maastricht Criteria in the 
Eurozone could be counterproductive if they fail to account for unforeseen circumstances. 
An evaluation of the literature reviewed indicates that studies on the impact of political 
and institutional factors on fiscal deficit and deficit persistence are biased towards the experience 
of more developed countries of the world.  Further, a number of existing studies, particularly for 
developing countries, are bereaved of the robust methodological framework. For instance, Ifere 
and Okoi, (2017) used OLS regression technique that is obviously unable to account for any 
potential endogeneity problem in the model. This seems tohave been reflected in the mixed 
results that they have produced. Further, many of the past works (see e.g., Futas and Mihov, 
2002; Lane, 2002, Areaza et al.,1999; Hercowitz and Strawezynski, 1999) do not adequately 
account for the cyclically adjusted part of the deficit. Obviously, this has led to misleading result 
since the cyclical component of the deficit when it is unaccounted for, would tend to make the 
fiscal policy response appear more countercyclical. This study, therefore, will add value to 
literature in this area by adequately accounting for the cyclical component of fiscal deficit using 
the Holdrick-Prescot Filter. We also rely on a more robust estimation framework, namely the 
Instrumental Variable technique which represent an improvement over OLS as it is able to 
account for potential endogeneity problem. 
 
4. Methodology and Data 
The empirical methodology we adopt is two-prongs and covers a set of 10 West African 
countries –  namely, 6 WAMZ countries (Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone) and 4 WAEMU countries (Guinea Bissau, Niger, Senegal and Togo) – for which we are 
able to find consistent data.In the first strand, we specify two sets of fiscal character equations, 
each for government spending and tax revenue. This enables us dis-couple each country’s fiscal 
stance (on tax revenue and expenditure) into responsiveness, persistence and discretion 
components. In the spending policy rule (equation 1) – for instance –  general government 
spending is specified as a function of log real GDP, lagged spending, and a set of control 
variables, namely; contemporaneous inflation rate and the lagged and current oil price (see 
Afonso, Alnello and Furceri, 2010; Fatas and Milhov, 2003, 2006 for a related approach). The 
second strand of our empiricalspecification relies on a cross-country regression of fiscal 
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persistence parameter on a set of political, institutional and macroeconomic fundamentals that as 
known to be important determinants of fiscal persistence. As in Fatas and Milhov (2001) and 
Afonso (2010), the cross-sectional regression is implemented within the Generalized Least 
Square (GLS) framework in order to account for potential heterogeneity andcross-sectional 
variability across the sample countries. Thus, our specifications explore both the time series and 
cross-sectional information contained in the data. 
We set out with the specification of the so-called fiscal character equation, which 
unpacks measures of national fiscal positionsinto quantitative estimates of ‘persistence’, 
‘responsiveness’ and‘discretion’componentsfor each of the 10 West African economies in our 
sample, thus: 
ln     =    α 
   + β 
  ln         +    λ 
           +    φ 
   ,    +  ε  
      1 
ln     =    α 
   + β 
  ln         +    λ 
           +    φ 
   ,    +  ε  
     2 
where: The variables: S= general government spending (% GDP); R= general government revenue (%GDP); GDP = 
real GDP(at 2010 constant $ US), Z=  a set of control variables which include real oil prices and current inflation 
rate. 
 
Given the spending and revenue equations (eq. 1 and 2) for each country, we have a total 
of 20 estimable baseline equation for first tranche model (country-specific regression). Equation 
1 and 2 are estimated using an IV approach. The motivation for adopting this approach is to 
mitigate the effect of possible endogeneity of both government spending and revenue with 
respect to output level (GDP). We use as instruments for contemporaneous output in each 
country-equation the second lag of real GDP of the country.The parameters measure the country-
specific coefficients, where:αi =intercept; βi =fiscal responsivenessparameter(measured as the 
elasticity of government spending and revenue to output); λi = fiscal persistence parameter 
(measured as the elasticity of first lag of government spending/revenue with respect to output); 
φ  = joint coefficient of control variables; and δ= discretionary fiscal shock (measured as the 
standard deviation of ε  
  and ε  
 ). 
The rationale for including the control variables is intuitive, straightforward and follows 
standard practice in the literature. Oil prices are included because they affect the state of the 
economy and infact constitutes a significant part of energy spending in the countries. Inflation is 
included to account for potential spells of aninflationary spree and to ensure that our results are 
not driven by inflation as in Afonso, Alnello and Furceri (2010). However, our study differs from 
Afonso,et al (2010) in terms of our focus on: (i) Africa and ECOWAS, in particular; and (ii)a 
carefully designed investigation of the effect of political activities, institutional, demographic 
and macroeconomic determinant of fiscal policy persistence or lack of counter-cyclical in West 
Africa. 
The second strand of estimable equationsspecifies a cross-country model of fiscal 
persistence parameter for the spending equations. Following the standard specification in the 
11 
literature, we model spendingpersistence in terms of a set of political, institutional and 
macroeconomic fundamental (see e.gAfonso et al 2010; Gali, 1994; Fatas and Milhov, 2006; 
Fatas and Milhov, 2001b for a sister approach)4We estimate the following cross-country 
Generalized Least Square (GLS) regression model using the fiscal (spending) persistence 
parameter is the response variable. 
 
 1 , ,
S
i i j i j i
j j
P E                                 (3) 
for all I = 1 to N. In particular,the dependent variable is spending persistence ( Si ) retrieved from 
the country specific IV regression while the set of regressors included in the model consist of the 
following:  
(a) Political and institutional variables (P) comprising of World Governance indicators on– (i) 
index of corruption (COR) (ii)index of rule of law (LAW) (iii)index of regulatory quality (QTY) 
(iv) index government effectiveness (GEF) (v) political stability (STAB); and 
(b) macroeconomic variables (E) – comprising (i) total fiscal deficit (FD) (ii) real GDP growth 
rate (GDPG)(iii) real GDP per capita (GDPC) (iv) CPI-based inflation rate (INF) (v) GDP 
deflator-based inflation rate (INFD) (vi) external debt (% GNI) (DEBT) (vii) trade openness 
(OPN). 
 The a priori expectations about the sign of the variables are as follows. Aside corruption 
that is expected to positive impact spending persistence, all other institutional variables (rule of 
law, regulatory quality, government effectiveness) as well as political stability are expected to be 
negatively related to spending persistence because improvement in this factors would allow 
policymaking to rely more on economic factors and sound fiscal principles rather than non-
economic considerations. On the other hand, corruption is expected to perpetuate fiscal 
irresponsibility, embezzlement and lack of prudential financial management which will increase 
spending persistence. And so, corruption is expected to be positively related to spending 
persistence.  
Considering alternative specifications of eqt.3 using different sets of regressors in the 
GLS model, we arrived at 3 parsimonious estimated equations reported in columns C3 through 
C5 of Table 5. Since our dependent variable is based on estimates rather than actual observation, 
there are potentials for larger standard error than usual and therefore lower t-statistic which 
would lead wrong decision concerning the statistical significance of the traditional OLScross-
country estimate. In fact, if we employ the usual (unweighted) OLS, our regression residual 
                                                          
4
 A large body of literature has found that economic variables are correlated with fiscal persistence and spending 
as well as with automatic stabilizers (see e.g., Poplawski, 2008; Fatas and Milhov, 2001, 2003; Rodrick, 1998). 
Similarly, the cross-country variation in fiscal persistence and government spending are generally explained by 
political and institutional factors (see Person, 2001; Person and Tibelllini, 2001;  andFatas and Milhov , 2003).  
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would comprise of two components, namely: the sampling error (the difference between the true 
value of the dependent variable and its estimated value) and the random shock (that would have 
been obtained even if the dependent variables are based on observed values rather than estimates. 
Under this scenario, there is, therefore, the need to correct for this un-measurable error term. In 
this study, we correct for potential heteroscedasticity arising from cross-country variability by 
relying on the weighted least square rather than the usual OLS. In particular, we implement the 
cross-country regression using the GLS and weight the model with the inverse of the 
heteroscedastic term. 
The data series used in country-specific regressions include general government total 
expenditure (S), general government total revenue (R), index of oil price (Oil) and the CPI-based 
inflation rate (INF). The last two variables are used as acontrol in the fiscal character model (eq. 
1 and 2). Here, the second lagged value of GDP is used as aninstrument for the contemporaneous 
level of output so as to control for potential endogeneity problem in equation 1 and 2.The 
sources of these data and the descriptions of the variables are as presented in Table 3 (see 
Appendix). 
 
 
 
5..Results 
 
5.1..IV Estimate of Fiscal Characterization Parameters in West Africa 
 We set out with the result of the Instrumental Variable (IV) regression of the fiscal policy 
stance (spending and revenue) unpacked into the three components – persistence, responsiveness 
and discretion (Table 4 and 5). Since we are basically interested in investigating the economic, 
political and institutional determinants of fiscal persistence in West Africa as clearly stated in the 
objectives, we pay special attention to the persistence parameter and include the responsiveness 
for ease of comparison and clarity. 
 As clearly stated in the section on methodology, we follow standard practice in the 
literature (see Alfonso, 2010) and measure fiscal policy persistence as the elasticity of the first 
lag of government spending/revenue with respect to output5.Looking at the coefficientsreported 
inTables 4 and 5,it is easily seen that the size of spending persistenceis generally larger than that 
of the responsiveness coefficient. This is also true when we consider the number of persistence 
parameters that are statistically significant. In particular, while the persistence parameters are 
statistically significant in most of the cases (9 times for revenue and 7 times for spending), the 
responsiveness parameters are significant for a fewernumber of cases (6 times for revenue and 5 
times for spending). Overall, this gives a total of 15 statistically significant fiscal persistence 
parameters and 11 statistically significant fiscal responsiveness parameters. As in Lavigne 
(2006), this result suggests that fiscal policy in West Africa is more persistent that responsive. 
                                                          
5
Fiscal Policy persistence refers to the dependence of contemporaneous fiscal policy on their past behaviour (Afonso, 
2010). We remark that we followed the standard practice in the literature (see e.gFatas and Milhov, 2001, 2003) and computed 
‘fiscal policy discretion’ as the standard deviation of the residuals from both the spending and revenue equations.  Thus, smaller 
and less significant persistence and responsive parameters would imply higher discretionary parameter – suggesting a negative 
relationship between fiscal persistence and discretion. 
 
 
Table 4: IV Estimate of Spending Persistence, Responsiveness and Discretion
Dep. 
Variable:LogSpening(lnS) 
Resp. 
Guinea Bisau -2.2, E8 (0.002)**
Niger 0.028563(0.23) 
Senegal 0.38491(0.6) 
Togo 0.02368(0.22) 
Gambia 2.52 e-08 (0.001)**
Ghana 3.66, e-11(0.8) 
Guinea 3.02, e-9 (0.001)**
Liberia 2.67 E-09 (0.5) 
Nigeria 0.07005(0.03)** 
Sierra Leone 0.074205 (0.046)**
 
Table 5: IV Estimate of Revenue Persistence, Responsiveness and Discretion
   
Dep. 
Variable:Log 
Revenue(lnR) 
FiscResp Rev Persistence
  
Guinea Bissau 1.3 E-9 (0.48) 0.35(0.09
Niger 0.1031489(0.001)** 0.1372(0.30)
Senegal 0.065232(0.001)** 0.4962(0.001)
Togo 0.11478(0.012)** 0.045(0.91)
Gambia 3.64 e-08 (0.001)** 0.84(0.001)
Ghana 1.15e-11(0.012)** 0.73(0.001)
Guinea 7.17E-10(0.171) 0.73 (0.001)**
Liberia -5.0 E10 0.99 (0.001)**
Nigeria 0.012267(0.44) 0.83(0.001)
Sierra Leone 0.078202(0.003)** 0.404(0.06)
 
The result presented in Table 4 and 5 addresses the 
estimate the magnitude and significance of fiscal persistence and unpack the national fiscal 
positions (spending and revenue) of African economies into the persistence, responsiveness and 
discretion components. Nonetheless, 
impact of political, institutional and macroeconomic variables on fiscal persistence
Africa, i.e., to investigate the determinant
economic and politico-institutional determinants of fiscal persistence (Table 6)
 
 
5.2 Determinants of Fiscal Persistence
 
 Parameters
Persistence.      . 
Discre 
                     
oil 
 0.31 (0.15) 4.79 n0.05 (0.146) 
0.789162(0.001)** 0.1 0.00089(0.22) 
0.6999(0.001)** 0.06 0.0014(0.04)** 
0.82(0.001)** 0.11 0.0009 (0.29) 
 0.14(0.56) 2.09 0.009(0.7) 
0.83(0.001)** 2.01 0.06(0.02)** 
 0.49 (0.001)** 2.86 -0.025(0.314) 
0.860 (0.001)** 4.71 0.016 (0.083)* 
0.244742(0.26) 0.18 0.0021(0.37) 
 0.484(0.067)* 0.12 0.0012(0.25) 
 
  
 Discre. contr control
  oil infd
)* 4.56 0.0051 (0.919) 0.04 (0.34)
 0.27 0.0042(0.02)** 0.00875(0.58)
** 0.05 0.0009(0.01)** 0.0081(0.23)
 0.12 0.0033(0.03)** 0.00315(0.44)
** 1.5 0.044(0.002)** 0.164(0.007)
** 1.79 0.0041(0.83) 0.0489 (0.13)
 1.42 0.023(0.184) -0.001(0.966)
 -2.01 0.018 (0.4) 0.079 (0.076)
** 0.21 0.0034(0.12) 0.0402(0.001
* 0.21 0.0015(0.13) 0.0108(0.02)
first objective of this paper which is to 
asthe second objective of this paper is to
s of fiscal persistence, the next issue we analyze is the 
. 
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Infd 
 
Endo Test for IV 
 
n0.033 (0.477) s(0.001)** 
0.01132(0.02)** s(n0.001) 
** 
0.0074(0.09)* s(n0.001) 
** 
0.0034(0.14) s(n0.001) 
** 
0.1589 (0.3) s(n0.001) 
** 
0.07(0.13) s(n0.001) 
** 
n0.033(0.45) s(n0.001) 
** 
0.075 (0.361) s(n0.001) 
** 
0.349(0.061)* s(n0.001) 
** 
0.0017(0.43) s(n0.001) 
** 
  
 End test for IV 
 r (0.001)** 
 R(0.001) ** 
 R(0.001) ** 
 R(0.001) ** 
** R(0.001) ** 
 R(0.001) ** 
 R(0.001) ** 
* R(0.001) ** 
)** R(0.001) ** 
** R(0.001) ** 
 investigate the 
 in West 
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We now proceed to analyze the determinants of fiscal persistence of government 
spending, the so-called spending persistence (Table 6). From Table 6;columns 3, 4 and 5 
represent different specifications of the estimated Generalized Least Square (GLS) model using 
different setsof regressors. 
 
Table 6: Determinants of Spending Persistence (West Africa) 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 
EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLES 
Macroeconomics GDPG -0.22(0.003)** -0.2(0.00017)** -0.6(0.016)** 
Debt - - 0.8E3 (0.87) 
INF - - -0.05(0.14) 
infd - - - 
GDPC - - 0.0005(0.24) 
Institutional corruption 0.34(0.001)** 1.77(0.0001)** 3.13(0.035)** 
govteff -1.09(0.0024)** -0.87(0.0049)** -0.58(0.57) 
rule of law - - 3.13(0.0035)** 
Political pol Stab -0.42(0.003)** -0.45(0.0055)** - 
Key: ‘-‘ stands for not applicable. 
 
From Table 6, the key result of the GLS regression can be summarized as follows. First, 
corruption is the major institutional factor explaining spending persistence in the region. Thisis 
because the coefficient of corruption turned out to be statistically significant in all the three 
specifications whose results are reported in C3, C4 and C5. For instance, corruption index is 
statistically significant with a coefficient of 0.34 and ata probability value of 0.001 (in the model 
represented as C3). Similarly, models C4 and C5 returned a result with corruption index being 
significant in both cases; 1.77 with a probability value of 0.0001 (for model C4) and 3.13 with a 
probability value of 0.03 (for model C5).  
Second, the impact of corruption on spending persistence is more pronounced in both 
magnitude and statistical significance when we shocked the estimable GLS model with zero 
regulatory quality, i.e., when we assumedregulatory quality away from the model.This is 
arguably a plausible assumptionin which one could presuppose a West African region in which 
the various national governments neither regulates its key institutions nor private business 
dealing. Expectedly, our result suggests that corruption would tend to thrive more under this 
scenario. 
Third, output growth is the key macroeconomic determinant of spending persistence 
among countries in West Africa. This result is rather not too surprisinggiven that larger national 
output and income would imply that the various national governments in the region are able 
toundertake and funddeficit spending.  
And fourth, Political stability, rule of law and governments effectiveness are 
alsoimportant in explaining spending persistence in West Africa. We were, however, unable to 
find evidence for a significant effect of debt stock, GDP per capita, regulatory quality and 
inflation rate (CPI-based) onfiscal persistence in West African Economies. 
 
 
 
6. Conclusions and Lessons for Policy 
 
This study has effectiveness made use of a two-step estimation procedure to pursue a 
twofold objective. First, an empirical decoupling of fiscal policy into three 
components:persistence, responsiveness and discretion parameteris implemented using the 
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instrumental variable (IV) Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) regression technique on a 
country-by-country basis. Second, we investigate the determinants of spending persistence in the 
context of 10 selected West African economies for which we are able to find consistent data. We 
model the spending persistence in terms of a set political, institutional and macroeconomic 
fundamentals– that have been hypothesized as key drivers of fiscal persistence – using a rich 
data set. 
The key conclusions of our analysis are as follows. Fiscal policy is more persistence than 
responsive in most of our sample countries. This result is consistent in terms of both the 
magnitude and statistical significance of the spending persistence parameters.  
From the cross-country Generalized Least Square (GLS) result, we found that the core 
institutional factors determining spending persistence in West Africa include corruption, 
government effectiveness and rule of law while the primary political factor is political stability. 
The effect of regulatory quality turns out to be insignificant.More interestingly, corruption is 
found to significantlyimpact spending persistence in all three different specifications of the GLS 
model. Remarkably, the size and significance of the corruption term improve whenwe shocked 
our model with zero regulatory quality- suggesting that the effect of corruption on fiscal 
persistence might thrive more in the absence of government controls.. 
 From the policy standpoint, our finding that fiscal policy is more persistent implies that 
the fiscal authorities havelittle leeway or flexibility to curb spending behaviour,particularly in the 
short run. This finding is particularly relevant given our finding that government spending is 
overall more persistent thangovernment revenue. More so, given that more fiscal 
persistenceimplies less discretion, it may be more difficult for the fiscal authorities in the 
regionto implementtemporary activism and perhaps even more difficult to reverse itwhen it is no 
longer needed. An additional policy implication stems from the fact that while government 
effectiveness contributes to reducing spending persistence, corrupt act to perpetuate it. This can 
be seen as a recommendation for the governments to improve their frameworks and governance 
procedure and to tackle corruption more decisively.  
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Appendix 
Table 3: Data Sources and Variables Descriptions  
Variable Code Description Source 
Debt Stock  DEB External Debt Stock, total (DOD, Current US$) WDI (current US$) 
Debt/GNI DEBT External debt stocks (% of GNI) WDI 
Gross Domestic Product GDP GDP (Constant 2010 US Dollar) WDI (2010 Const. 
US$) 
General government 
revenue (LCU’ b) 
GR Revenue consists of taxes, social contributions, grants receivable, and other revenue. Revenue 
increases government’s net worth, which is the difference between its assets and liabilities (GFSM 
2001, paragraph 4.20). Note: Transactions that merely change the composition of the balance sheet 
do not change the net worth position, for example, proceeds from sales of nonfinancial and financial 
assets or incurrence of liabilities. 
WEO(bil. of LCU)  
General government total 
expenditure (LCU’ b) 
 
GE Total expenditure consists of total expense and the net acquisition of nonfinancial assets. Note: 
Apart from being on an accrual basis, total expenditure differs from the GFSM 1986 definition of 
total expenditure in the sense that it also takes the disposals of nonfinancial assets into account. 
 
WEO (bil. of LCU) 
General Government 
Expenditure(% GDP) 
S General Government Expenditure(% GDP) WEO 
General Government 
Revenue (% GDP) 
R General Government Revenue (% GDP) WEO 
Oil Prices Oil Log of real Petroleum annual average spot price OPEC Bulletin 
Oil Production OPR Ratio of Oil production to GDP OPEC Bulletin 
Inflation Rate Inf Inflation, as measured by the consumer price index, reflects the annual percentage change in the 
cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed or 
changed at specified intervals, such as yearly. The Laspeyres formula is used 
WDI 
Trade Openness Opn  IFS 
Govt Effectiveness GEF Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree 
of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, 
and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. 
WGI 
Political Stability (Index) STAB Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of 
political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism.  
WGI 
Corruption Index COR Control of corruption reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by 
elites and private interests. 
WGI 
Reg. Quality QTY Regulatory  Quality reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development 
WGI 
Rule of Law LAW Rule of law Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, 
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence 
WGI 
GDP Per Capita GDPC GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$ WDI 
19 
GDP Growth Rate (annual) GDPG GDP growth (annual %) WDI 
Note: WGI estimates of governance (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performances).  
GE and GR are based on WEO compilations from Ministry of Finance or Treasury Latest actual data: 2015 Fiscal assumptions: Fiscal projections for 2015 are based 
on the authorities’ budget whereas the 2016 forecast was made to have a 1.7 percent of GDP fiscal consolidation (compared to 2015). Start/end months of reporting 
year: January/December GFS Manual used: Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM) 1986 Basis of recording: Accrual General Government includes: Central 
Government; Valuation of public debt: Nominal value Primary domestic currency: CFA Franc Data last updated: 02/2017 (see WEO, 2017).  
Where: WEO stands for IMF’S World Economic Outlook; WDI represents Word Bank’s World Development Indicators and WGI  stands for World Governance 
Indicators. 
 
 
